Gateway Provider FNPRM Gets Mixed Reactions

The proposal imposes "several robocall mitigation requirements that may unnecessarily burden gateway providers," said Incompas. It's "unclear" why a gateway would need to implement a robocall mitigation plan for portions of its networks that use Stir/Shaken, Incompas said. Allowing them to do either "should be sufficient.” USTelecom said all providers should have robocall mitigation, "regardless of their Stir/Shaken implementation status." The plan "does not demonstrate that there will be any material benefit to the public from the imposition of these additional obligations on voice service providers simply because they may act as gateway providers," said T-Mobile.

Require all intermediate providers to certify a robocall mitigation plan to "better ensure that there is a chain of trust from the originating provider to the terminating provider," USTelecom said. CTIA agreed, and said foreign intermediate providers should be required to do the same. "Promoting robocall mitigation by intermediate providers will promote use of these techniques by all entities in the call path and in turn help protect U.S. networks from illegal traffic," it said. Several commenters backed eliminating the foreign provider prohibition.

Define gateway providers as those that are the "first U.S.-based provider in the call path for a foreign-originated call," said Twilio. Gateways acting as intermediate providers should also be required to certify they have a robocall mitigation program or have implemented Stir/Shaken technology in the robocall mitigation database, it said. Incompas recommended changing the definition of a gateway provider as the "first intermediate provider in the call path of a foreign-originated call that receives traffic at its U.S.-based facilities before transmitting the call directly to another intermediate ... or terminating voice service provider in the" U.S.

The proposed rules impose "significant obligations on gateway providers who have no involvement in the initiation of illegal robocalls," said SipNav. It asked the FCC to consider "[leveraging] the media IP address of the server that actually initiates the known scam calls." Rules should apply "regardless of whether a provider plays an originating or intermediate role," said ZipDX. It said the "burden for keeping illegal robocalls off our network should fall entirely on US-based providers."

Imposing a "know your customer" requirement on gateway providers "will cause disruption of commerce and favor carriers that have less robust" practices in place, said YouMail. It backed a "safe harbor protection" for providers that "build protections into their contracts," which Transaction Network Services echoed. Any "prescriptive" practices are "unnecessary, overly burdensome, and likely unworkable," said CTIA, saying the FCC should maintain a "flexible approach."

Phase-out the Shaken extension for gateways using non-IP network technology, said TransNexus. It "provides a loophole that bad actors could exploit," it said, noting there are standardized non-IP Shaken methods available. Extend Stir/Shaken implementation requirements to gateway providers, said Comcast: The FCC should "do everything it can to facilitate the transition to IP-based networks."

Expand the use of the do not originate list without making it public, said Somos. Adoption of the list by gateway providers "would help combat illegal calls that are evading detection today," it said.