House Divided on Approach to Secure U.S. Power Grid

Subcommittee Chairman Ed Whitfield, R-Ky., appeared eager to craft power grid legislation that would pass both the House and Senate this session and asked witnesses what suggestions they had to create a more agreeable bill. Last month the House Commerce Committee reintroduced a discussion draft of the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense (GRID) Act. The legislation would amend the Federal Power Act to enable FERC to address security threats to the electric grid (CD June 10/10 p13). The draft is identical to Reps. Fred Upton, R-Mich., and Ed Markey’s, D-Mass., HR-5026 that, despite passing the House last year with a voice vote, never received a full vote in the Senate.

Rep. Trent Franks, R-Ariz., suggested splitting cybersecurity from the GRID Act because of the Senate’s differing strategies on how to protect it. In February, Franks introduced HR-668, the Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage (SHIELD) Act to focus specifically on thwarting the impact of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events on the nation’s electric infrastructure. Franks’ SHIELD Act preserves many of the provisions of the GRID Act but omits the cybersecurity element. Though he affirms that cybersecurity is a critical issue, Franks said it has become “complicated” by the administration’s cybersecurity plan. “My concern is that if we tie them together it may weaken them,” Franks said. “The fact that we are now 100 percent vulnerable means we should start securing our electric infrastructure now."

Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., commended President Barack Obama for taking some “very serious steps in the right direction,” and hoped the administration’s plan would help “clear some of the hurdles in the legislation.” Langevin suggested the subcommittee keep cybersecurity language in the bill and incorporate additional protections for critical distribution systems used in major cities. “I'm concerned that by specifying only the ‘bulk power system,’ this legislation excludes critical distribution systems that would leave major cities, like New York and Washington, D.C., unprotected by the broader provisions in the bill,” Langevin said.

The current draft legislation would require the president or Energy Secretary to notify Congress when a threat triggers the FERC’s authority to act and discontinue any emergency measure ordered by the commission within a year. It also forces the commission to request and consider recommendations by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation before addressing a grid security vulnerability. The bill gives the president more flexibility in designating critical defense facilities and clarifies that grid security threats and vulnerabilities can affect non-programmable electronic devices. Last week House Judiciary Internet Subcommittee Chairman Bob Goodlatte, R-Va., criticized the President’s cybersecurity plan for its broad definition of critical infrastructure (WID May 26 p1).

An attack on the U.S. commercial electric grid could have “potentially devastating” effects on America’s war fighting capabilities and natural disaster response, said Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs Paul Stockton. U.S. international war fighting capabilities depend on military facilities in the U.S. that are tied to the commercial electric grid, Stockton said. Although most military bases in the U.S. have auxiliary power sources in case of an attack those capabilities are only temporary, he said. Furthermore if a natural disaster affected portions of the U.S. power grid, as did the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, “the loss of electric power would increase the scale of the magnitude of the disaster to which we are responding,” he said.