The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls issued guidance Oct. 5 on the “see-through rule” -- a “colloquial phrase” that refers to the impact of controls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations. DDTC clarified the rule by stressing that ITAR controls and requirements do not “disappear simply because the defense article is integrated into another item.” If an ITAR-controlled component is integrated into a “larger system or end-item,” the component does “not lose its identity.” DDTC said “the ITAR ‘sees through’ the larger system or end-item and continues to regulate that defense article.”

The State Department is working to improve its new online licensing system and wants to establish an industry working group to help the system run smoothly, said Karen Wrege, chief information officer at the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Wrege said she was surprised at how quickly industry acclimated to the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (see 2002040060 and 1905070055), which she said has made export licensing processes easier for those working remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The State Department announced procurement bans and export controls on 11 entities and one person for violating export restrictions imposed by multilateral control groups. The restrictions, said a notice released Oct. 2, apply to entities in China, Russia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, their subsidiaries and one person in China for illegally trading items restricted by multilateral control groups, including the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. The order bans U.S. government procurement and government sales to any of the entities or people involving items on the U.S. Munitions List and controlled under the Arms Export Control Act. It also suspends export licenses for items controlled under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and the Export Administration Regulations. The order took effect Sept. 23 and will remain in place for two years. It applies to the following entities:

The State Department may intervene in certain patent applications if they contain technical data controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls said in guidance issued Sept. 30. While DDTC said it does not “restrict” the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from publishing patents, it may impose an “invention secrecy order” on the patent application if it contains ITAR-sensitive information. That secrecy order would force the USPTO to “withhold the publication of the application or the grant of a patent.”

The State Department issued the final version of its guidance on exports of surveillance technology (see 1909040071 and 1911060049), which includes definitions and guidance principles for companies to weigh before exporting sensitive items to potential human rights abusers. The Sept. 30 guidance expands on the agency’s initial definition of human rights due diligence and offers a range of red flags and due diligence considerations, but did not significantly narrow its definition for surveillance items, despite requests from industry.

The State Department will temporarily remove export restrictions on nonlethal defense goods and services to Cyprus, the agency said in a temporary final rule released Sept. 25. The move will suspend restrictions for one year on exports, reexports, retransfers and temporary imports of certain defense goods if the end user is the Cyprus government, a “request” is made by or on behalf of the Cyprus government and no “credible” human rights concerns are involved with the shipment. The State Department said it will suspend the restrictions, which includes amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, because Cyprus is cooperating with the U.S. on anti-money laundering revisions and has taken steps to deny Russian military vessels access to ports for servicing. The restrictions will be lifted Oct. 1 and will expire Sept. 30, 2021, unless extended.

A former employee for a Virginia night-vision equipment manufacturer pleaded guilty to selling night vision devices and components over the internet, the Justice Department said Sept. 23. Steven Rosine stole the equipment while working as a production engineer at Harris Corp.’s manufacturing facility in Roanoke, where he had access to the company’s equipment. The Justice Department said Rosine, of Troutville, Virginia, stole and sold image intensifier tubes, night vision systems and other parts, a majority of which were made using “classified production data” and controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Rosine made more than $119,000 from selling the ITAR-controlled items. He faces a maximum 10-year prison sentence and a possible fine of up to $250,000.

A U.S. citizen was sentenced to 21 months in prison for stealing technology data from U.S. companies and illegally exporting it to South Korea, the Justice Department said Sept. 16. Si Mong Park stole technical proprietary data from two American defense contractors where he worked as a software engineer, the agency said. In 2011, he took data related to military aircraft and a missile system to South Korea, presenting the data to non-U.S. people to “drum up business for his company,” the Justice Department said. The information contained technical data subject to export controls under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Along with the prison sentence, he was sentenced to three years of supervised release.

Registration and licensing applications for the State Department’s Defense Export Control and Compliance System will be unavailable 6 a.m. to 8 a.m. EDT Sept. 22, a Sept. 18 notice said. The system will be down for scheduled maintenance, the State Department said, and users should save work in progress before the downtime begins.

A lack of understanding of export controls in university settings is delaying or sometimes preventing research, the Association of University Export Control Officers said in a Sept. 17 letter to the Department of Defense. The group said the confusion is particularly a problem surrounding export restrictions on fundamental research: research that is widely published and shared within the scientific community.