The Bureau of Industry and Security this week added 32 parties to its Unverified List after it was unable to verify their “legitimacy and reliability” for receiving export-controlled items. The additions include 14 entries in China, five in the United Arab Emirates, four in Turkey, two in Germany and one each in Bulgaria, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore.
The EU is “assessing” whether to create an outbound investment screening regime, which could help it address “gaps” in its dual-use export controls, Valdis Dombrovskis, the bloc’s top trade official, told the European Parliament this week. “We're currently at the exploratory stage,” he said.
New frequently asked questions on the Bureau of Industry and Security's October China chip controls are “almost through their clearance process,” Sharron Cook, a BIS official, said during a Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee meeting this week. “Those should be up shortly,” she said.
The Bureau of Industry and Security will soon request feedback from industry, academia and others on key differences in U.S. and EU interpretations of export control provisions, said Charles Wall, BIS’ senior policy adviser for the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. Wall, speaking during a BIS technical advisory committee meeting this week, said the notice will ask for “very specific information” on discrepancies between the two territories' export control regimes and ways those rules can be harmonized.
The Bureau of Industry and Security is hoping its new Disruptive Technology Strike Force leads to more investigations of export control violations, faster prosecutions and more criminal enforcement actions, said John Sonderman, director of the BIS Office of Export Enforcement. The agency also is looking to clamp down on U.S.-origin items ending up in Iranian drones, said Kevin Kurland of OEE, warning that companies should make sure they’re complying with the new Iran Foreign Direct Product Rule issued last month.
The Commerce Department this week released proposed “guardrails” for recipients of Chips Act funding, which could restrict how the funding is used in certain countries and align the guardrails with export restrictions. The proposed rule would block funding recipients from pursuing certain chip investments in China and other “foreign countries of concern,” restrict them from participating in certain research or technology licensing efforts with those countries, prevent the funding from being provided to companies on the Entity List and more, Commerce said.
The Bureau of Industry and Security is preparing to publish a proposed rule that would expand the agency’s restrictions on certain activities that support foreign military, security or intelligence services. The rule, expected next week, would implement a provision in the FY 2023 defense spending bill that one lawmaker hailed as the “largest expansion of presidential export control authority in several years” (see 2212210032).
Trade lawyers are expecting a sharp increase in DOJ export control and sanctions prosecutions in the coming months as the agency’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section undergoes a hiring spree, and several law firms said the increased attention on sanctions violations may cause some companies to bolster their compliance programs.
The U.S. needs to reform the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to allow it to more easily share controlled technologies with the U.K., Australia and other close allies (see 2302170022), experts said last week. If Congress and the administration don’t move quickly to relax ITAR restrictions, the Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) partnership will fail, they said, and U.S. military capabilities could fall behind China and other countries.
The Bureau of Industry and Security is relaxing its licensing policy for certain satellite exports, a change that could have a “major” impact on satellite industry sales, Commerce Deputy Secretary Don Graves said. As part of the change, BIS will review export applications for satellites and satellite components intended to go to Missile Technology Control Regime countries on a case-by-case review policy instead of a presumption of denial, Graves said.