Subsea Cable Interests Renew Opposition to FCC's SLTE Licensing Proposal

The replies also included more calls for the FCC to simplify its existing subsea cable licensing regime. In August, the agency adopted a submarine cable licensing order and a further NPRM that proposed SLTE blanket licensing (see 2508070037).

The record is clear that completely domestic SLTE poses no meaningful risk to national security, NCTA said. If the FCC requires SLTE licensing, it should establish categories, with a "wholly trusted actor" category that's subject to limited regulatory requirements, the group said. "Potentially trusted actors” that have foreign ties and require "further scrutiny" would be subject to SLTE licensing, while "untrusted actors" posing national security threats wouldn't be able to obtain licenses.

CTIA said there's broad agreement that the FCC should create an expedited process for submarine cable applicants that don't pose big national security concerns. There's also consensus against the FNPRM's proposed cybersecurity-related licensing requirements and against a "rip and replace" program for legacy equipment, the group said. Requiring removal of such legacy equipment "would be burdensome and costly, would pose logistical challenges, and could deter future private investment."

The International Connectivity Coalition similarly urged "a 'fast-track' process" for trusted providers, freeing them from some licensing and reporting burdens and government reviews focused on high-risk deployments. There's wide agreement against a blanket SLTE licensing regime, as it would be "burdensome" and not achieve FCC national security goals, the group said. Instead, it urged the agency to opt for a notification-based framework for SLTE, as that would provide relevant information but avoid the delays and regulatory burdens involved with FCC licensing.

Incompas said the FNPRM "reach[es] too far" and should be revised, arguing that SLTE owners and operators shouldn't be subject to licensing requirements but to notification and information-reporting mandates. The FCC lacks statutory authority to put a blanket licensing regime on SLTE owners and operators, Incompas added, as the Cable Landing Licensing Act allows licensing of only subsea cable operators, and SLTE owners and operators don't land or operate the cable.

Accidental damage, such as by ship anchoring and commercial fishing, remains the biggest risk to subsea cables, said the Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law. The best defense "is redundancy and diversity." In addition, the group said average cable permitting and licensing timelines have gone from less than a year to more than three years, so the U.S. should streamline the approval process for new cables and set up a single point of contact for permitting and licensing. That single contact point wouldn't replace existing agency authorities "but would coordinate interagency engagement, reduce duplicative requests, and provide a clear and predictable process for applicants."

Crosslake Fiber, which operates a cable system in Ontario and New York, said the FCC's SLTE licensing proposal "is misguided and will stifle network deployments and innovation through dramatically increased regulatory burden." The agency has already ensured secure SLTE operations with its submarine cable order, which prohibits certain SLTE transactions with entities “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” Crosslake said. Remaining SLTE concerns could be addressed by imposing simple notification and certification requirements, it added.

Lockheed Martin advocated for the FCC to coordinate subsea cable landing license applications with other federal agencies that authorize use of the seabed, such as NOAA. That kind of coordination can minimize the risk that a cable is laid near ocean mineral recovery operations, it said.