Wireless Industry Voices Strong Opposition to FCC Prison Jamming Proposal

“CTIA is not aware of any jamming technology that can distinguish between communications from authorized and unauthorized devices, nor does the … FNPRM identify any,” the group said in comments posted Tuesday. “It is thus reasonable to expect that jamming will block all communications over commercial wireless spectrum within the correctional facility, including lawful calls made by facility personnel, contractors, medical personnel, visitors, and public safety officials,” as well as calls to 911 and wireless emergency alerts.

Tests in 2018 and 2019 failed to demonstrate that jamming could be limited to targeted areas, CTIA noted. A 2018 test at the Federal Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, involved a single jamming device targeted at an adjacent cell. “Even with only a single jammer … the jammer’s power was measurable at outdoor locations where jamming was not intended, 100 feet away from the building (the farthest distance at which testing was conducted).” The group added that correctional officials have indicated that they would need to deploy multiple jamming devices in real-world scenarios.

CTIA also questioned whether the FCC has the authority, as it asserts, to allow jamming. “The text, structure, and purpose of the Communications Act make clear and unambiguous that it does not authorize the FCC to permit jamming,” the group said. The FNPRM “points to two general statutory provisions to support its authority,” Sections 301 and 303 of the act, but “neither of these supports the jamming proposal.” To avoid the prohibition, the FCC proposes to “deauthorize” contraband devices, “but that attempted workaround does not work.”

CTIA has long argued that allowing jamming would be “bad policy.” Managed access systems (MAS) and cell detection “provide options that can assist corrections officials in both large and small facilities,” the group said in 2020 (see 2009170053). In its filing this week, CTIA again emphasized that “MAS is lawful, effective, and proven,” and it continues to improve.

AT&T also opposed the jamming proposal in comments posted Tuesday. The FNPRM “rests on the flawed assumption that jammers can block unlawful communications without inhibiting lawful communications.” That's why “AT&T and other wireless carriers have worked closely with solutions providers to develop, deploy, and refine MAS.” In addition, the carrier stressed that jamming would block emergency communications. “Because many correctional facilities are located in densely populated areas, even a small amount of leakage can have significant impacts" on nearby users.

“By design, jamming systems block all radiocommunications on the targeted spectrum, irrespective of the content or purpose of the communication, or the identity of the handset user,” Verizon similarly said. Jamming would interfere with calls to 911, first responder communications, emergency alerts, crash notifications and “other non-emergency but critical communications (e.g. vehicle assistance) in the affected area.” The carrier noted that it supported the deployment of solutions working with MAS vendors in 31 states, terminating service to nearly 4,800 devices.

The Telecommunications Industry Association said contraband phones in prisons continue to pose a threat to public safety, but the FCC should be “circumspect” in authorizing jamming. In contrast to contraband interdiction systems, “which represent a surgical tool, RF jamming solutions are a blunt instrument,” the group said. Since the FCC first considered prison jamming more than a decade ago, industry has identified harms “posed by jamming systems -- specifically, potential interference with legitimate wireless devices in use inside and outside prisons and interruption to emergency communications.” Those harms remain, but the effects “are magnified by the increased use of wireless devices for broadband.”

The Competitive Carriers Association argued that jamming doesn’t pose a threat only in urban markets. The commission should “proceed cautiously, prioritize proven alternatives, and -- at a minimum -- require extensive testing and narrowly-tailored pilot programs before considering any broader authorization of jamming technologies,” it said.

GSMA pointed to problems experienced in other countries when they attempted to jam signals in prisons. For example, after deploying a selective jamming solution, New Zealand's Department of Corrections “reported interference with correctional officers' duress alarms and other emergency channels relied upon by staff,” GSMA said. “Similar stories have been reported in other regions, where such interference made it necessary to turn off jamming systems during emergencies such as riots in order to enable prison authorities to communicate and respond.” Inmates learned to take advantage of this vulnerability, “deliberately triggering disturbances so that jamming systems would be disabled, allowing them to place unauthorized calls.”