Poor CBP Funding Hurts Effort to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling, Says AAPA
Funding shortfalls are hampering CBP’s ability to ensure nuclear and radiological material doesn’t enter U.S. territory, said a representative of the American Association of Port Authorities in testimony to the House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation on Oct. 27 (here). Port authorities across the country are criticizing the CBP’s failure to effectively update radiation port monitors (RPMs) at U.S. ports, said Joseph Lawless, director of maritime security at the Massachusetts Port Authority.
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Improvements are desperately needed to properly prevent entry of nuclear and radiological material, said Lawless at the Oct. 27. “We are fast coming to the end of the first generation of RPMs’ life expectancy,” he said. “Ports such as Tampa, Jacksonville, Long Beach, [New York/New Jersey], and Mobile have all reported complicated discussions with their regional CBP officers on the ongoing responsibilities related to the RPMs.” Lawless urged Congress and the administration to “set a clear path on the RPM program,” adding that CBP needs to request more money through the appropriations process or the Department of Homeland Security should expand port access to grant programs.
But CBP Assistant Commissioner Todd Owen said the agency is currently spearheading a “major recapitalization” of nuclear and radiological detection equipment at land, air and sea points of entry across the U.S. That recapitalization is targeting radiation isotope identification devices, one of several types of equipment deployed by CBP alongside RPMs, said Owen. CBP is aiming for updates to its radiation detectors nationwide “over the next few years,” he said.
Radiation detection equipment at ports of entry has sounded more than 3.3 billion alarms over the past roughly 13 years, said Owen, noting that all those alarms were “successfully adjudicated at the proper level.” Owen lauded CBP’s partnership with the trade community through Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. The “rigorous security criteria” and “extensive vetting” in C-TPAT helps prevention of “dirty bombs” and other illicit material, Owen said. C-TPAT membership now includes more than 11,000 companies, he said.
The agency also relies critically on its partnerships with foreign countries, including through the sixty ports globally affiliated with CBP’s Container Security Initiative. “In addition to weapons-detection, many CSI ports are now also targeting other illicit materials, including narcotics, pre-cursor chemicals, dual-use technology, stolen vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and counterfeit products,” said Owen. “CBP’s 60 CSI ports in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin and Central America currently prescreen over 80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo that is imported into the United States. We anticipate that percentage to increase in the near future.”
CBP is still aiming to hit a 100 percent scanning for all incoming maritime cargo despite postponing that goal over recent years (see 14022702). The actual x-raying of the shipments poses the biggest roadblock to the 100 percent scanning mandate, rather than the detection portion, said Owen. The agency, through its partnerships, inspected one percent of total incoming cargo overseas before shipment to the U.S. and an additional 2.7 percent was inspected on arrival in the U.S., Owen said. Those shipments represents the greatest threat, he said. During the hearing, Rep. Janice Hahn, D-Calif., touted her legislation to require 100 percent scanning pilots at two U.S. ports (see 1505280014).
CBP has intently followed CBP recommendations for security improvement in recent years, said David Maurer, a director at the Government Accountability Office. CBP informed GAO in October that they developed a “threat matrix to help determine the sea ports of entry at the highest risk of nuclear and radiological smuggling, but that CBP had not completed its assessments for air and land ports of entry,” said Maurer, referring to CBP’s covert operation programs. GAO issued formal security improvement recommendations to CBP in January (see 1501280020). GAO launched an investigations into C-TPAT vulnerability in recent weeks, said Maurer.
Subcommittee Chairman Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., said, however, the drive is “growing” among global militant and other groups to acquire nuclear material. “It is concerning that the administration’s whole-of-government approach does not appear to include foreign nuclear policy,” Hunter said. “For an administration that proclaims to be anti-nuclear proliferation, we are heading down a path where our adversaries will have greater access to nuclear material.”