T-Mobile made an economic case for limiting how...

auction expert Peter Cramton. “Well-crafted spectrum aggregation limits can increase competition both in the market for mobile broadband services and in the spectrum auctions in which they are applied,” the paper said (http://bit.ly/1fW70D2). “The increased competition leads to consumer benefits such as increased innovation, accelerated deployment of advanced mobile services, and expanded consumer choice. It also can lead to improved auction efficiency and higher auction revenues.” Meanwhile, a paper released by Mobile Future, the subject of a Tuesday webinar, reaches the opposite conclusion. That paper, by Robert Earle and David Sosa of the Analysis Group, looked at the effect of such restrictions on auctions around the world (http://bit.ly/14uwIIr). “Restrictive and preferential participation rules in place for the 1994 U.S. PCS spectrum auctions resulted in lost consumer welfare of as much as $70 billion,” the paper said. “Underfunded and unfunded business plans developed by new entrants acquiring set-aside licenses resulted in substantial amounts of spectrum sitting idle for many years.” The paper cites the German 3G auctions held in 2000: “Policies intended to encourage market entry were unsuccessful and resulted in a 10-year delay in the assignment of one-third of the 3G spectrum, delaying its development and the benefits consumers would have otherwise enjoyed.” The paper asks “What happens, actually, when governments have chosen to adopt such discriminatory rules?” Mobile Future Chairman Jonathan Spalter said on the webcast. “Are the auctions less successful, do they serve their ultimate goals of getting more spectrum efficiently available for consumer use?"