DHS Overview of Drug Traffickers Use of C-TPAT to Transport Illicit Cargo
An October 2010 periodic report on security incidents issued under the Department of Homeland Security contains several paragraphs discussing in general terms what is known about drug traffickers use of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program for the surface transportation of illicit cargo to the U.S.
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(According to the report, C-TPAT offers U.S. and foreign companies shorter wait times and fewer inspections at U.S. ports of entry in exchange for enhanced security measures prior to arriving at the border, as well as an on-site review of supply chain security procedures. C-TPAT companies become Free and Secure Trade (FAST)-certified to use designated FAST lanes that provide these benefits.)
There is Mexico Drug Trafficker Use of C-TPAT Firms, but No Targeting Seen
The report states that information from the U.S. and Mexico regarding the vulnerabilities of C-TPAT indicates that drug traffickers use C-TPAT companies to smuggle drugs across the border, however border seizure statistics have not revealed a pattern suggesting targeted operations against such companies.
(Note that U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s “C-TPAT Highway Carrier Security Criteria" states that the scope of criminal elements targeting world commerce through internal conspiracies requires companies, and in particular, highway carriers, to elevate their security practices, especially if the highway carrier has the exclusive benefit of enrollment in the FAST program.
Also, in December 2010, CBP issued a C-TPAT security memo stating that marijuana smuggling from Mexico spikes during the fall months, and urged members to take certain precautions when loading and sealing containers, subcontracting highway carrier service, etc. See ITT’s Online Archives or 12/21/10 news, 10122117, for BP summary.)
No Evidence of "Cloning" of FAST Trucks, but Remains a Private Sector Concern
The report also states that drug traffickers have been known to hijack and clone legitimate commercial trucks to transport illicit cargo across the border, with one trade group estimating that over 10,000 commercial trucks were hijacked in Mexico in 2010.
While U.S. authorities lack evidence that drug trafficking organizations are able to clone FAST-certified trucks, the report states that it remains a concern of the private sector. Authorities believe the possibility that drug traffickers are using FAST-certified trucks remains low based on the numerous requirements for certification; however there is a potential threat based on the widespread cloning by drug traffickers of other commercial trucks.
C-TPAT Vulnerabilities Could Provide Opportunities for Terrorists
In closing, U.S. authorities note that although drug trafficking organizations have used C-TPAT companies to smuggle illicit cargo, program vulnerabilities may also provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to cross international land borders with less scrutiny.
(See ITT’s Online Archives or 01/07/11 news, 11010715, for BP summary of DOT’s concept plan to resolve the U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking dispute, which would allow more Mexican carriers to enter the U.S. beyond the border area, etc.)
(While this 14-page “unclassified/for official use only” government report on smuggling and terrorism is publicly available, BP is only offering by email the one page that pertains to commercial trade, which discusses C-TPAT and FAST as detailed above, to those who send email requests to documents@brokerpower.com.
CBP “C-TPAT Highway Carrier Security Criteria” (undated) available here. C-TPAT 5 Step Risk Assessment Process Guide (March 2010) available here.)