GAO Testifies on Maritime Security One Year After the Signing of the SAFE Port Act

The GAO states that its testimony synthesizes the results of its completed work as well as preliminary observations from its ongoing work related to the SAFE Port Act. The testimony pertains to cargo container security, security at individual facilities, and overall port security.

Cargo Container Security Has Improved, Implementation Challenges Remain

According to the GAO's testimony, federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the U.S., and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. However, federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation.

Highlights of the GAO's findings related to cargo container security are as follows (partial list):

Lack of details on in-bonds at port of arrival. GAO notes that CBP's in-bond system, which allows goods to transit the U.S. without officially entering U.S. commerce, must balance the competing goals of providing port security, facilitating trade, and collecting trade revenues. However, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol does not collect detailed information on in-bond cargo at the U.S. port of arrival that could aid in identifying cargo posing a security risk and promote effective use of inspection resources.

In-bond cargo may have inaccurate ATS scores. GAO states that for in-bond cargo, the Automated Targeting System scores generally are not updated until these goods move from the port of arrival to the destination port for official entry into U.S. commerce, or are not updated at all for cargo that is intended to be exported.As a result, in-bond goods might transit the U.S. without having the most accurate ATS risk score.

According to CBP, it is in the process of developing an in-bond weight set to be utilized to further identify cargo posing a security risk. The weight set is being developed based on expert knowledge, analysis of previous in-bond seizures, and creation of rules based on in-bond concepts.

C-TPAT performance measures don't focus on security. Although CBP has put additional performance measures in place to track the progress of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism(C-TPAT) in meeting its strategic goals, the GAO testifies that these efforts have focused on program participation and facilitating trade and travel and not on ensuring improved supply chain security, which is the program's purpose.

New 100% scanning requirement is departure from risk-based approach. The GAO states that recent legislative actions requiring CBP to test and implement a new program to screen 100% of all incoming containers overseas by 2012 (with possible extensions for individual ports) is a departure from CBP's existing risk-based programs. The GAO further states that CBP may have difficulty requiring 100% such scanning while also maintaining a risk-based security approach that has been developed with many of its international partners.

CSI staff (both U.S. and abroad). CBP has developed a human capital plan, and increased the number of staff at Container Security Initiative ports. CBP has also provided additional support to the deployed CSI staff in order to review information about all U.S.-bound containers at CSI seaports for high-risk contents before the containers depart for the U.S. However, CBP faces challenges in ensuring that optimal numbers of staff are assigned to CSI ports in part because of its reliance on placing staff overseas at CSI ports without systematically determining which functions could be performed overseas and which could be performed domestically.

ATS internal controls have improved. Consistent with GAO recommendations, CBP has implemented the following internal controls for the administration and implementation of ATS: establishment of performance metrics for ATS; manual comparisons of the results of randomly conducted inspections with the results of inspections resulting from ATS analysis of the shipment data; and development and implementation of a testing and simulation environment to conduct computer-generated tests of ATS.

Individual Port Facility Security Increased, Program Implementation a Challenge

According to the GAO, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve security at about 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, inspecting facilities to ensure they are complying with their plans, and developing special Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) cards for workers to prevent terrorists from getting access to secure areas. However, the GAO testifies that federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities.

For example, the SAFE Port Act required the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) to implement TWIC at the 10 highest-risk ports by July 1, 2007; conduct a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies in the maritime environment; issue regulations requiring TWIC card readers based on the findings of the pilot; and periodically report to Congress on the status of the program. However, TSA missed the SAFE Port Act's July 2007 deadline to implement TWIC because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. (See ITT's Online Archives or 10/10/07 news, 07101015, for BP summary announcing that TWIC would begin at the Port of Wilmington, DE on October 16, 2007.)

In addition, the Coast Guard has written port-specific security plans to deter and respond to terrorist attacks, but these plans do not fully address recovery issues (e.g., how to reopen a port after an attack) and natural disasters (hurricanes, etc.).

Overall Port Security Has Improved, Resource Constraints Impede Further Efforts

The GAO testifies that federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports.

However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers.

(See ITT's Online Archives or 11/06/06 news, 06110625, for the final part of a multi-part BP summary of the SAFE Port Act, with links to previous parts.)

GAO contact - Stephen Caldwell (202) 512-9610

GAO testimony (GAO-08-171T, dated 10/16/07) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08171t.pdf