Homeland Security Council Issues "National Strategy for Maritime Security"

(In December 2004, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13 that, among other things, directed the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to lead a collaborative interagency effort to draft a recommended NSMS. See ITT's Online Archives or 04/18/05 news, 05041815, for BP summary of HSPD-13.)

Highlights of National Strategy for Maritime Security

The following are highlights of strategic actions outlined in the NSMS (partial list):

International customs and maritime security initiatives to be coordinated by the State Department. The NSMS states that the State Department will coordinate initiatives to enhance international cooperation, one of which is to expand the use of modernized and automated systems, processes, and trade-data information to make vessel registration, ownership, and operation, as well as crew and cargo identification, more transparent and readily available in a timely manner.

Another initiative described in the NSMS involves implementing standardized international security and World Customs Organization (WCO) frameworks for customs practices and standards to ensure that goods and people entering a country do not pose a threat.

According to the NSMS, where appropriate, new initiatives will build upon existing efforts such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), etc.

Embedding security into commercial practices. The NSMS also seeks to embed security into commercial practices in order to reduce vulnerabilities and facilitate commerce. NSMS explains that both the government and the private sector will continue to conduct vulnerability assessments to identify defenses that require improvement. A consistent risk management approach, which requires a comprehensive assessment of threat, likelihood, vulnerability, and criticality, will allow the private sector to invest in protective measures as a supporting business function.

NSMS singles out the following actions as necessary to increase the security of commercial practices

Implementation of key legislation and international requirements. NSMS believes embedding security practices and vulnerability reduction efforts into commercial practices rests upon the implementation of key legislation, such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the Trade Act of 2002, as well as International Maritime Organization (IMO) requirements such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and public-private partnerships such as the C-TPAT.

System-wide common credential for all transportation modes. NSMS also states that commercial businesses must put in place effective means to control access to their facilities. In cooperation with the private sector, the U.S. will establish a system-wide common credential for use across all transportation modes by individuals requiring unescorted physical access to secure, restricted, and critical areas of the maritime domain.

Security measures must accommodate commercial/trade requirements, etc. NSMS adds that security measures must accommodate commercial and trade requirements, facilitate faster movement of more cargo and more people, and respect the information privacy and other legal rights of Americans. To support the accelerating growth of global commerce and security concerns, security measures must: (1) be aligned and embedded with supply chain information flows and business processes; (2) keep pace with supply chain developments; (3) optimize the use of existing databases; and (4) be implemented with the minimum essential impact on commercial and trade-flow costs and operations. NSMS notes that this will require new and enhanced partnerships, as well as cost- and burden-sharing between the private and public sectors.

Mandatory reporting of information by private sector for screening purposes. NSMS states that physical cargo inspection adds another layer of security; however, physical inspection of all cargo would effectively shut down the entire U.S. economy. Therefore, NSMS recommends the use of mandatory reporting information provided by the private sector so that the U.S. can screen all inbound cargo and inspect all cargo designated as high-risk and ideally prescreen it before loading. In addition, all inbound cargo would be screened for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their components. NSMS further explains that establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Defense Office will contribute to improving the detection of a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material entering the U.S. through the maritime domain.

(According to the NSMS, the plans outlined in this document will be updated on a periodic basis in response to changes in the maritime threat, the world environment, and national security policies. In conjunction with the NSMS, the Department of Defense (DoD) and DHS have developed eight supporting plans to address the specific threats and challenges of the maritime environment. See the NSMS for more information on these plans.)

NSMS (dated September 2005) available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf

Information on the eight supporting plans is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0608.xml