COAC Subcommittee's Report to DHS on Container Security (Part IV - Final)

As part of its deliberations on "secure systems of international intermodal transportation," the MTSA Subcommittee was requested by DHS to consider the issue of performance standards for a "smart" container concept, as well as specific questions regarding deployment, cost-benefit considerations, and whether such standards should serve as a security baseline or should be considered as part of a voluntary or incentive based approach (i.e., as part of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) or otherwise).

This is Part IV, the final partof a multi-part series of summaries of the MTSA Subcommittee's report on its recommendations, and highlights the MTSA Subcommittee's recommendations regarding empty containers, foreign and domestic non-maritime transportation, and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.

Empty Containers

In its report, the MTSA Subcommittee notes that it created a special subgroup to consider the issue of empty containers. According to the Subcommittee, DHS officials stated that there was departmental consensus that empty containers do not present a sufficient security risk to require container sealing.

Recognizing that there was not a basis for requiring the sealing of empty containers, the subgroup then considered the issue of whether empty containers should be inspected. At the end of considerable discussion of the issue and a recognition that no meaningful government threat assessment exists to guide industry discussion on this issue, the subgroup reached consensus (the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) not agreeing) as follows:

Inbound empty containers arriving at a U.S. port. For inbound (i.e., U.S. import) empty containers arriving at a U.S. port on a vessel from a foreign port, the Subcommittee states that ocean carriers have agreed in their Sea Carrier Customs- Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Agreements with CBP to "visually inspect all empty containers, to include the interior of the container, at foreign ports of lading."

The consensus of the Subgroup was that this current C-TPAT approach to inbound empty containers was acceptable and did not need to be changed. Furthermore, such inspected empties do not need to be reinspected at the U.S. port of discharge. Coast Guard and CBP officials in attendance concurred that this was the government's view.

Outbound empty containers arriving at a U.S. port facility.For outbound (i.e., U.S. export) empty containers arriving at a U.S. port facility, there was discussion of the lack of a threat assessment, the complexity of the issue if empty vehicles utilized in domestic transportation are perceived to present a significant terrorist threat, and the substantial costs and operational issues that would result if every outbound container received at a U.S. port were required to be inspected.

The consensus of the subgroup was that a security analysis should be conducted to ascertain the existence, nature and magnitude of a potential threat of terrorists using empty containers, and that this analysis should consider the life cycle of the container from the time it is emptied of cargo until it is either reloaded with cargo or exported.

Notwithstanding the current lack of a threat analysis on this question, the MTSA Subcommittee recommends that for outbound empty containers the issue should be addressed under the Coast Guard's MTSA regulations by having the receiving port facility, pursuant to its approved facility security plan, randomly screen arriving empty containers to verify that they are empty at the same rate that the facility screens cargo transportation vehicles entering the facility pursuant to its facility security plan. The facility could use technology to meet this objective.

Intermodal Transportation

The MTSA Subcommittee states that it was requested by DHS to focus on intermodal transportation that has an international maritime segment, and its recommendations reflect that focus. Although the Subcommittee states that it also recognizes that the security of land transportation of intermodal containers, both in foreign countries and the U.S., is relevant to a secure transportation system, recommending new security regimes for land transportation companies around the world and domestically, is beyond the scope or ability of the Subcommittee to address in its report.

Foreign modal interchange operations. The Subcommittee notes that it was unable to fashion a practical recommendation to address the numerous foreign trucking, rail and barge movements of containers moving in other nations' jurisdiction. The Subcommittee states that at some point in the future, C-TPAT might evolve to include this portion of C-TPAT shippers' supply chains, but the Subcommittee states that it did not believe it was currently practical to recommend that C-TPAT consider enrolling truck, rail or barge transportation companies offering services in foreign countries.

U.S. domestic modal interchange operations. Regarding the movement of international containers as they are transported domestically in the U.S., the Subcommiittee notes that the important government security clearance is, not when the goods make formal entry into the U.S., as that could be many days after the cargo leaves the port, but when CBP releases the cargo from the port of arrival for further transport.

(The Subcommittee notes that the issue of "in bond" movements was not analyzed or discussed in any substantial way.)

The MTSA Subcommittee states that it believes that, for purposes of expanding "security programs" to other segments of the domestic transportation industry, such an objective is beyond the scope of the subcommittee and COAC. Such a major undertaking needs to be closely coordinated with other federal advisory committees on transportation, involve transportation participants from the various Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISAC) and upcoming Security Coordination Councils, the modal agencies within the Department of Transportation (DOT), and other groups of interest in protecting U.S. transportation infrastructure.

Transportation Worker Identification Credential

The MTSA Subcommittee states that it recommends that DHS give the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program more urgent priority to ensure that transportation personnel within the U.S. who enter/exit secure transportation facilities have been vetted through a background check process. While the TWIC program will affect more than intermodal transportation with a maritime nexus, the Subcommittee states that it believes that this national, uniform program would provide relief from the myriad of uncoordinated, security programs requiring background checks when operating throughout the intermodal environment. According to the Subcommittee, it is critical that the program be developed in close consultation with industry (the trade) to ensure that the system achieves its security goal without undue burden to any stakeholders.

(See the MTSA Subcommittee's report for a minority report of the ILWU regarding "Short Term Minimum In-Transit Container Security Enhancement" (Deliverable 1).)

(¹ COAC's MTSA Implementation Subcommittee was formed at the request of DHS to advise it on the implementation of its obligations under MTSA in three areas of concern:

1. Performance standards for the physical security of intermodal containers;
2. Development and implementation of the "secure systems of transportation" mandate; and
3. Quantitative performance metrics to measure the success of specific DHS cargo security programs and to guide future efforts.)

The Subcommittee reported at the September 2004 COAC meeting that they were able to complete work (and issue this report) on only the first two (of the above three) areas of concern, to date.)

(See ITT's Online Archives or 11/04/04, 11/05/04, and 11/08/04 news, 04110405, 04110510, and 04110805, for Parts I-III.)

COAC MTSA Implementation Subcommittee report, including full COAC comments and ILWU minority report, available by emailing documents@brokerpower.com.